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ABSTRACT

Lowe, Nathan R. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. The Competitive Effect of
Vouchers on the Performance of Traditional Public Schools in Hamilton County, Ohio.
Major Professor: Dr. Marilyn A. Hirth, Purdue University
The purpose of this quantitative study is to determine the effect that educational choice,
in the form of vouchers, is having on the performance of traditional public schools in
Hamilton County, Ohio. The threat of losing students to vouchers creates a sense of
competition for students, and ultimately the dollars that are attached to them. This
competition is relatively new to public education and is being promoted by state
legislators as a catalyst for public school improvement. All data sets were obtained from
publically available data on the Ohio Department of Education website between 2001 and
2012. Between 2001 and 2012, 107 Hamilton County schools had data points for each
year. Twenty-five (25) of those schools were threatened by voucher eligibility in 2006
and eighty-two (82) were exempt from the threat of vouchers. The twenty-five schools
threatened by vouchers increased an average of ten (10) Performance Index points
between 2007 and 2012. The 82 non-threatened schools only increased an average of one
(1) Performance Index point. The voucher-threatened schools closed the achievement
gap 17 Performance Index points between 2001 and 2012. When the voucher effect was
compared in a multiple regression to other factors that may contribute to change in
performance, only the voucher variable was significant. Going from a non-voucher

x
eligible school to a voucher eligible school is associated with a 19% increase in PIS from
2007 to 2012. Schools that are eligible for vouchers are not closing at a significantly
faster rate than non-voucher eligible schools in Hamilton County, Ohio based on a ChiSquare Test of Independence. The results of this study indicate that the traditional public
schools in Hamilton County Ohio have responded positively to the threat of competition
from vouchers. The EdChoice (voucher) program seems to be having a positive effect on
the performance scores of previously failing public schools. Recommendations were
made to educators and legislators who are debating this topic at the state level.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

How do the following words apply to the traditional public education system:
competition, capitalism, free market economy, supply and demand, marketing, and
choice? In the past twenty years these words have begun to play a major role in the
public education system in the United States of America. For the bulk of the twentieth
century, public education was associated with words that fit more with a social welfare
economic philosophy: words like free, equal, compulsory, state-controlled, and
guaranteed. Most people, especially those without disposable income, had only one
option when it came to education: the public school down the street. There were no other
viable options. Private schools were reserved for middle or upper class citizens who
could afford the cost of tuition.
All that changed on the national level on June 27, 2002, when the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Zelman et al, v. Simmons-Harris et al, “that vouchers did not
violate the Establishment Clause, thus leading the way for voucher programs throughout
the United States” ("NCSL," 2012). Education vouchers are public monies, placed in the
hands of parents and students, to be spent on private education at the school of their
choice. The first city to adopt a school voucher plan was Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In
1990, when it started, only private schools with no religious affiliation could receive the
vouchers, and consequently, only several hundred students took advantage of the
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program. Within ten years, vouchers had been extended to parochial schools in
Milwaukee and the number of students jumped to 10,000 (Peterson, Campbell, &
Brookings Institution, 2001).
Since then, Louisiana, Ohio, Indiana, and the District of Columbia have passed
legislation granting vouchers to low-income families. Several privately funded voucher
programs have also been introduced in major metropolitan areas. Seven states: Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Utah, have endorsed legislation
allowing voucher support for all special needs students who wish to attend non-public
schools ("NCSL," 2012).
The Voucher Debate
The National Conference of State Legislators (2012) outlines the arguments on
both sides of the voucher debate. Proponents of the vouchers suggest that the system
provides more educational opportunities for low-income students. At the same time,
vouchers should create an incentive for public schools to improve as a result of
competition with parochial and private schools. Proponents also believe that vouchers
will result in a better education for students because bureaucracy will be reduced and
parents will gain more influence and control in educational decision making.
On the other side of the debate, opponents claim that vouchers serve to weaken
public schools by siphoning much needed monies away from traditional public schools.
Then states give those monies to private schools with little accountability attached for
how they are spent. Some opponents argue that the amount of money provided through
vouchers is insufficient to provide real equality in educational access when only a
fraction of the tuition cost is covered. Because of the limited funds offered through
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vouchers, low income students still do not have the opportunity to attend the most
expensive private schools. Finally opponents assert that vouchers serve to lower the
quality of public education by drawing away the most informed parents and students,
thereby creating increased segregation along socioeconomic lines ("NCSL," 2012).
In spite of the arguments on both sides of the voucher debate, it is interesting to
note that what started out as a movement to increase educational opportunities for parents
has become a tool for the educational reform of traditional public schools (TPSs). This
issue is the focus of the following research.
Statement of the Problem
As each state wrestles with the voucher question in the next few years, these are a
few of the questions that legislators and education committees are asking: What is the
effect when competition is introduced to the public education system? Do TPSs improve
their program to attract or keep students? Do teachers work harder to produce engaging
lessons and higher performing students? Do superintendents and principals provide more
professional development for staff, better resources for quality learning, and marketing
plans to promote their accomplishments? Are public schools really “weakened” by
voucher programs as the opponents claim? Do the students who are “left behind” in the
TPS suffer educational or social harm as a result of this new form of competition? What
data could we study to find out the answers to these questions?
These questions and others have motivated the following research. The answers
to these questions will determine the future of public education in the United States of
America, and possibly the world. If the competitive effect of vouchers, charters, and
expanded educational choice can be shown to drive the improvement of public education,
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then it will be implemented as a tool in each state of the union. It will be embraced by
both political parties as a legitimate method of educational improvement. It will gain
momentum and be used by increasingly larger percentages of the population.
If, however, the competitive effect of school choice is not legitimized as a catalyst
for public school reform, then it will most likely remain a tool used by a small segment
(traditionally less than 1%) of our population to equalize educational choice. It will only
be accepted in education circles as an alternative option for parents at lower socioeconomic levels. In other words, vouchers will primarily be used as a means to equal the
playing field for relatively few impoverished families, but will not be an accepted method
of educational reform.
My own educational experience is split evenly between public and private
education. I spent my elementary, secondary, and undergraduate work in private,
parochial schools. Then I spent the next 15 years in public education as a teacher, coach,
and administrator; and I am working on my second post-graduate degree from a public
institution. Now I work for a private, faith-based alternative school which partners with
public schools to provide drop-out prevention programming. Based on my diverse
background and experience I am well positioned as a researcher to understand and
explore both sides of this issue.
Although vouchers are relatively new to education, the concept of choice is not.
The public charter school concept has enjoyed much wider acceptance as it moved from
state to state in the past twenty-five years, and excellent data are available on charter
schools to help researchers make claims about their effectiveness (Bohte, 2004; Booker,
Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2008; Holmes, DeSimone, & Rupp, 2006; Lubienski &
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Weitzel, 2010; Ni, 2009). We now know more about the competitive effect on the TPS
in each state with charter school laws on the books. What we do not know is if that
competitive effect works the same with vouchers as it does with charters. Matthew Carr
(2009) and David Figlio (2010) are two researchers who have published research in this
new area (Carr, 2009; Figlio, Hart, & Urban Institute, 2010), and in both cases, they had
only a few years of data with which to work. This study will attempt to expand this
research because of access to several more years of data.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate the competitive effect of vouchers on
the traditional public school as measured by changes in the quality of education measured
by performance indicators. This study focusses on the EdChoice “voucher” program in
Hamilton County, Ohio. Hamilton County is home to Cincinnati Public Schools as well
as several suburban districts. School performance as measured by the Performance Index
Score (PIS) is compared before and after the EdChoice program was introduced in 2006.
Carr (2009) was working with only two years of data, and now there are six years of data
after vouchers were introduced available for evaluation. The long-term effects or trends
of the voucher program on TPSs in Hamilton County are now observable. Hamilton
County Ohio was chosen because it has a smaller data set that is fairly representative of
the entire state. Cincinnati has a healthy mix of urban and suburban schools; high
performing and low performing schools; poverty and wealth; small and large
enrollments; and ethnic diversity. One final advantage is that vouchers are relatively
new to Hamilton County, unlike the Cleveland Public Schools which introduced vouchers
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in the mid 1990’s. Comparable data prior to 1990 are not readily available for Cleveland
Public Schools, thereby eliminating Cleveland from the study.
Research Questions
1. Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a statistically significant
difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County as measured by the PIS?
2. How well does time explain the variation in mean PIS scores for voucher
eligible and non-voucher schools?
3. When holding other variables constant, is the threat of vouchers found to be a
statistically significant predictor of PIS variation for voucher eligible schools?
4. Do we see an increased incidence of school closings with voucher eligible
schools in Hamilton County?
Chapter two reviews the literature available on the competitive effects of school
choice, charters, and vouchers. The smallest area of research is on the topic of vouchers,
and this study will add to this research by studying a well-established voucher system in
Hamilton County Ohio. The implications for other states debating this type of legislation
for educational reform are deep and far-reaching. Before the education system continues
down the road of competition and educational choice, educators must take a critical look
at those states who are marching out in front. This leads directly to the literature review.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction
This review of the literature begins with a broad view of school choice and
narrows toward the more recent voucher phenomenon that is sweeping the nation.
School choice includes homeschooling, open enrollment, magnet and charter schools,
alternative and online schools, and vouchers to attend private schools. Each state is
moving through this polarizing repertoire of options at different rates and with differing
levels of success.
The second major area in this literature review deals with the idea of competition
as a catalyst for school improvement. This concept has been debated philosophically for
years. Now that we have more than twenty years of school choice experimentation
nationwide, researchers and legislators are able to back up their positions with data.
Many educators believe the competitive effect of charters and vouchers on public schools
is very similar, so this review of the literature will begin with the largest body of research
(charters) and narrow toward the research area with the least amount (vouchers).
The third section focuses specifically on the competitive effect that charter
schools are having on traditional public schools. A charter is typically a smaller, retooled
public school that is exempt from much of the regulation that governs traditional public
schools. Charter schools were chosen because most states have had them for many years,
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and there is a growing body of peer-reviewed research on these schools. And, unlike
private school data or homeschool data, the data on charters are publically available,
making empirical research much easier to accomplish. This educational concept (the
charter school) has also been embraced by the educational community more widely than
other choice options.
Between the third and fourth sections of the literature review is a sub-section on
creaming and reverse-creaming. Much of the research on the competitive effect of
charter schools narrows in on the issue of creaming or sorting of students. This question
is raised by opponents of charters and vouchers who claim that only the best students,
those who have the most parental support, will take advantage of the voucher or charter
option and consequently leave the traditional public school. Then the scores in the
traditional public schools will go down and the achievement gap will widen.
The fourth major area narrows even further to the voucher question: Does the
threat of the voucher motivate public schools to improve? Vouchers are public funds that
are used by students to pay the tuition at private schools, including religious institutions.
Vouchers are usually the last stop on the school choice bus because of the litigation that
surrounds church-state separation. Because the voucher concept is relatively new to the
education world, research on the competitive effect of vouchers is limited.
School Choice Trends in the USA
In the American School and University Journal, Kennedy (2007) gives a concise
description of the changes taking place in public education as states and schools respond
to the demand for more options. He uses data from the National Center for Education
Statistics 2006 survey, "Trends in the Use of School Choice,” to support his premise.

9
Before open enrollment became the norm, parents had little choice but to attend the
school in whatever district they lived. Unless they could afford private school tuition and
transportation, the public school was the only option. In fact, that is how many families
shopped for housing. They chose to live in a school district based on the quality of the
local public school. In the past 20 years, that has begun to change. “80 percent of
school-age children in 1993 attended the school to which they were assigned; by 2003
only 74 percent were attending their assigned school” (Kennedy, 2007, p. 20). With open
enrollment the norm now in most states, that number will continue to plummet.
As dissatisfaction with public schools increases, more options become available.
The survey found that the parents of students enrolled in assigned public
schools were in general less satisfied with their children's schools than
parents of students in chosen public schools or private schools. (Kennedy,
2007, p. 22)
Kennedy (2007) also points out that school choice availability to parents varies
across the country. More than 61 percent of parents report public school choice options
in the West, compared to 39 percent in the Northeast, 47 percent in the South, and 58
percent in the Midwest. These choice options include charter schools and voucher
schools, and suddenly Traditional Public Schools (TPSs) are facing a competitive market
for the first time in United States history. Schools must now compete for students and
the state dollars that follow those students.
Proponents of school choice argue that the entire educational system benefits
from the competition to attract and/or keep students. Belfield and Levin (2002) find that
“increased competition and higher educational quality are positively correlated” (p. 297).
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This conclusion makes perfect sense to economists, and if it were that simple we could
adopt it as policy and be done with it. Opponents of school choice are quick to point out
however, that it is not that simple when dealing with the complexities of educational
choice. Belfield and Levin (2002) recognize this and clarify this finding in the next
sentence. “However, the effects of competition on education outcomes appear to be
substantively modest. Between one-third and two-thirds of the estimates lack statistical
significance, and the methods applied are often multivariate regressions (Belfield &
Levin, 2002, p. 297).
Yongmei Ni and David Arsen (2011) have done extensive research on this debate.
They have been researching school choice and competition in Michigan for several years.
They explain that those in favor of school choice believe that if funding is tied to
enrollment, TPSs will have “incentive to compete and increase their effectiveness and
efficiency by working harder and implementing educational improvements” (Ni & Arsen,
2011, p. 3). They go on to explain that critics of school choice believe that competition
will only widen the gap between those with access to quality education and those without
it. School choice policies will “create winners and losers relative to the status quo,
increasing academic, racial, and social class stratification while further concentrating
many of the most disadvantaged students in schools depleted of the personnel and
resources needed for improvement” (Ni & Arsen, 2011, p. 3).
As Ni and Arsen (2011) delve deeper into the reasons that families choose one
school over another, they find that socioeconomic factors may play a larger role than the
quality of education in the decision to select another school. Parents who exercise choice
options tend to move away from schools with high populations of poverty or minority
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students. This finding plays a major role in the competitive effects of school choice. “In
short, our results indicate that in Michigan….the market signals these policies provide to
school personnel have very little to do with the student academic outcomes they strive to
improve” (Ni & Arsen, 2011, pp. 20-21). Opponents claim it causes a form of de facto
segregation, and no educational improvements.
Public school choice typically begins with open enrollment, a system that drops
the traditional boundary markers between school districts. Students can attend any
school for which they have transportation. David Welsch and David Zimmer (2010)
studied Wisconsin’s open enrollment program that was introduced in 1990 and was
considered by school choice advocates to be a pioneer state in this realm. These two
authors were looking at student migration in general. When a student has the option to
move out of a district, how does that district respond? They conclude that when students
begin moving out of a district, standardized test scores improve slightly in the following
year. “In particular, districts that experience a 5 percentage point increase in outmigration subsequently witness increases of about 4–7 percentage points in the
percentage of students scoring advanced or proficient” (Welsch & Zimmer, 2012, p. 206).
They also conclude that schools typically focus more on preventing out-migration than
attracting in-migration of students. This shows that, at least in Wisconsin, TPSs are
affected by student migration. What it does not show, is whether the overall educational
quality increased. Further study is required to show the cause of the test score increases.
Open enrollment is now mandated by NCLB 2002 for schools that are failing to make
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for two consecutive years, and many states have
adopted legislation allowing this basic level of choice for all schools.
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At the other end of the public school choice spectrum is the voucher option,
where public dollars can be directed to private, often religious schools. Although this
concept is still hotly contested at the state level, in 2002 the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Zelman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Ohio, et al, v. Simmons-Harris et
al., “that vouchers did not violate the Establishment Clause, thus leading the way for
voucher programs throughout the United States” ("NCSL," 2012).
Ironically, both political parties have embraced the school choice movement to
varying degrees, although the implementation and regulation is still debated.
The major difference in the current voucher discussion is, in speculation,
that successful parties will embrace the winds of political change ushered
in by a historical presidential election and an ecumenical coalition calling
for comprehensive school reform. Just as Senator Blaine embraced
nationalism in lieu of political and religious conflict, both former Speaker
of the House Newt Gingrich and the Rev. Al Sharpton have united to
embrace President Obama's vision for school reform. This phenomenon
signals a bipartisan platform for school reform that may recast the school
choice debate. (Sutton & King, 2011, p. 265)
Literature in the area of school choice trends in the United States suggest that the
current political climate nationwide has swung the pendulum in favor of vouchers,
charters, and choice. Percentages of students attending charters and private schools are
up. Homeschooling is continuing to rise nationally. Movement is trending away from
the TPS which is no longer the only game in town. Vouchers aimed at low income
families are allowing this segment of the population into the educational choice arena for
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the first time. Wherever these publicly-funded choices have been challenged, even on the
grounds of separation of church and state, courts have decided in favor of expanded
choice, thereby taking students, money, and resources from the public schools. The
reason for this shift is not so much that charters or vouchers have been proven effective,
but a general and growing dissatisfaction with the public school system in America.
Competition as a Catalyst for School Improvement
School choice as a movement was started on the premise that parents should have,
as the name implies, choice in the education of their children. Somewhere along the way,
another purpose was added by education reformers. They looked at traditional public
schooling and asked these questions: What if school choice could be a motivator for
schools to improve? Would schools work harder to keep or attract students and the
money attached to them by the state? Would TPS students ultimately perform better on
achievement tests as a result of this increased competition?
George Holmes and others (2006) compared test scores in schools before and
after competition was introduced in North Carolina and found that charter school
competition serves to increase the overall academic performance of traditional public
schools. Using seven measures of the impact of charter-school competition, Holmes et
al. found that four of the seven measures were statistically significant while the other
three measures were just short of statistical significance. The authors concluded that:
All else being equal (including the school's score on the performance
composite the previous year) the presence of charter-school competition
increases traditional school performance by about 1 percent. This
represents more than one-half of the average achievement gain of 1.7
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percent made by public schools statewide between 1998-99 and 19992000 and is, from a policy perspective, nontrivial. (Holmes et al., 2006,
pp. 69-70)
Holmes et al. (2006) begins his concluding sentence (above) with the phrase, “All
else being equal…” and the fact is that not all else is equal. The temptation is to compare
the performance of the public school before and after competition is introduced, and if
scores improve, assume it was a result of the competition. After studying traditional
public schools in Michigan, Ni and Arsen (2009) are cautious about that conclusion.
They suggest that the benefits of choice policies on educational outcomes in traditional
public schools have not yet been established. “While it is appropriate to be cautious
about drawing strong policy implications from extant research, the results thus far are
hardly compelling” (Ni, 2009, p. 24). Correlation does not equal causation.
That is not to say that there are no TPS benefits associated with choice
competition. Public schools are forced to think creatively when enrollment is dropping
and funding is disappearing. In Kansas City Missouri, almost twenty percent of the
students are now enrolled in charter schools (Kennedy, 2007). The district
superintendent, Anthony Amato, took this “opportunity” to realign the buildings and
programs that were left and eliminate the middle schools altogether. It was found that the
new preK-8 configuration resulted in “more efficient use of facilities; fewer transitions
between schools; improved attendance and achievement; fewer discipline problems;
better curriculum articulation; increased parental involvement; longer-term relationships
with teachers; and students having the same school schedule as younger siblings”
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(Kennedy, 2007, p. 23). These benefits cannot be discounted and are a direct result of
students leaving the TPS for local charter schools.
The findings regarding the impact of school choice on motivation for school
improvements are mixed. Much depends on the location that is being studied and the
methodology used by each researcher. Ni (2009) studied Michigan and found no positive
effect of competition on the traditional public schools. She states that after a dozen years,
the Michigan schools are just as bad as they have ever been. Holmes (2006) seems to
find reason for a more positive outlook in North Carolina, where charter school
competition has helped raise the traditional school performance by 1 percent. This is
significant because it represents more than half of the achievement gain for public
schools in a 3 year period. Kennedy (2007) uses data from the National Center for
Education Statistics to show the shift away from public schools and toward educational
choice alternatives. His statistics are 6 years old, but a quick check of the current
numbers show that this trend has not slowed.
One limitation in these studies on competition and school performance is that it is
not merely economics being studied. Schools, human behavior, and learning are being
evaluated; and these are not strictly supply and demand; input and output issues. The
following questions must be asked: Was the increase in test scores a result of the new
teaching techniques and engaging curriculum, or was it a result of the natural sorting that
took place as a result of competition? The difference here is critical. If one goal of
educational choice is to prompt schools to approach learning differently and improve
their craft, it will be a failure if students are only sorted and rearranged. This point is
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actually made in the next section on the competitive effects of charters when Bohte
discusses creaming and reverse creaming.
The Competitive Effect of Charters on Public School Performance
Marcus Winters (2012) conducted a study on the effect of charters on public
schools in New York. He recognized that most of the attention and research surrounding
charters is focused on the performance of the students who left for the charter schools.
Winters studied the effect on the students who were “left behind” in the public schools
and found small but positive effects on educational achievement for students who stayed
in public schools when given the choice to move to charter schools. Winters suggests
that the competition created by the charter school movement has not harmed student
achievement. He finds that these results are consistent with the results of previous
studies which looked at the effect of school choice on academic outcomes of students at
public schools (Winters, 2012).
The most important contribution of this paper is its focus on measuring the
influence of school choice in a large urban setting. The finding that public
school students benefit, though slightly, from competition from charter
schools provides some encouragement for those who would continue to
expand the charter school sector in American cities. (Winters, 2012, p.
301)
Kevin Booker et al. (2008) studied charter schools in Texas and found that the
presence of charter schools had a positive effect on student test performance for the
students who remained in public schools. The authors further found this effect in both
reading and math as well as in “both district and campus level penetration measures, and
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across a variety of specifications” (p. 143). It was concluded that the presence of school
choice, in the form of charters, may result in systemic gains. It was not clear from this
study whether the same gains would be achieved from the institution of broader choice
systems such as vouchers.
Future research on the charter experiment which focused upon identifying
the sources of gains from competition would help inform the general
relevance of our findings. The relevance of school choice policies within
the current policy environment rests upon the accumulation of evidence,
such as ours, that children who stay behind are not necessarily left behind.
(Booker et al., 2008, p. 143)
John Bohte (2004) conducted a similar study in Texas which looked at how the
presence of charter schools impacts the achievement trends of high school students
enrolled in traditional public schools across the state of Texas. He compared the overall
pass rate on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) prior to and after charter
school competition was introduced. His interpretation of what he finds is interesting.
A 1 percentage point increase in countywide charter school enrollments
(as a proportion of total enrollments) is associated with a 0.10 percentage
point increase in district pass rates on TAAS exams the following year.
There is clear evidence that charter schools are having an impact on the
performance of students in traditional public schools. (Bohte, 2004, p.
511)
This seems like a very small percentage point increase after one year of
data to be claiming “clear evidence” of an impact on TPS student performance.
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To his credit, Bohte (2004) does use the results of a Texas Center for Educational
Research survey completed by more than 300 superintendents to obtain some
qualitative data. “At least a small part of the performance gains among students
in traditional public schools are likely the result of policy changes initiated by
administrators concerned about the impact of funding losses that result charter
competition” (Bohte, 2004, p. 515).
As Bohte (2004) searches for the reasons for his “clear evidence” he finds
“a much greater percentage of the performance gains among students enrolled in
traditional public schools likely result from the movement of at-risk students to
charter schools” (p.515). One interesting piece of information about Texas
charters is brought out by Yongmei Ni and David Anderson in The Charter
School Experiment (2010) edited by Lubienski and Weitzel. They note that
roughly one half of the Texas charters were designed for at-risk students. As
these students pull out of TPSs, the scores will naturally rise.
Creaming & Reverse-Creaming
John Bohte (2004) is getting down to the issue of how charter competition may
naturally produce higher test scores, depending on the design or purpose of the charter.
Critics of charter schools and school choice in general argue that
competition will lead to creaming, in which the best students transfer to
choice schools and, leaving traditional public schools with the burden of
teaching weaker students. An equally valid concern is whether choice
creates an avenue for “reverse creaming,” where administrators in public
schools purposely encourage the transfer of weaker students to charter
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schools in order to focus on less resource-intensive student populations.
(Bohte, 2004, p. 516)
Patrick McEwan in his 2004 study of Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Chile calls the
phenomenon “cream-skimming” when higher level students are removed from the public
school to participate in some level of school choice.
The mounting evidence on sorting suggests that cream-skimming could
lower the achievement of remaining public school students. This is not
necessarily a concern if the achievement declines from sorting are
outweighed by gains from competition. However, most of the literature
on private school competition does not suggest that gains would be large.
More alarmingly, it is not at all clear that research succeeds in identifying
the causal effect of competition. (McEwan, 2004, p. 76)
The flaw in his evaluation of this possible explanation is that the ends justify the means.
If the goal of competition is really school improvement, one should not be satisfied with
creaming or sorting of students to improve the data. And, as he points out, the gains from
competition are not significant enough in the research to outweigh any achievement
losses.
Ni and Arsen in Lubienski’s (2010) book, The Charter School Experiment,
identify and neatly summarize eleven studies on the competitive effects of charter
schools. Large urban district data or statewide data from Michigan, Arizona, Ohio,
Texas, North Carolina, and Florida have all been studied since 2000. What they find is
the results are “…mixed, with three studies finding negative competitive effects, three no
effects, and five positive effects. Where positive effects have been found, they are
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generally quite small” (Lubienski & Weitzel, 2010, p. 115). The authors identify the
problem of mixed results as the inability of researchers to remove the self-selection bias
of the students.
The preceding studies looked at the effect of charter schools on the public school
students that were left behind when their classmates enrolled in charters. Winters (2012)
found that public schools who actually lost students to charter schools were unaffected by
the competition, or showed mild benefits in English and math scores. Bohte (2004) adds
to the research by zeroing in on which student demographic remaining in the public
schools benefits most from the presence of a charter. The strongest performance gains
are found in the low-income students. Bohte (2004) goes on to define “creaming” and
“reverse creaming” as two likely results of charters that may have more to do with school
performance than the competitive effect of charters. Booker (2008) finds “robust
evidence” that students who are “left behind” in public schools when some students
choose to attend a nearby charter school are not really being left behind. In fact, their
achievement scores in math and reading improve. Ni and Arsen in Lubienski (2010)
summarize the charter school competitive effects as early and inconclusive. “Charter
school competition is a very blunt policy tool for bringing about needed reforms in urban
schools” (p. 118).
Examples of Competitive Effects of Vouchers on Public School Performance
The final area to be explored in this literature review is the competitive effect of
vouchers on public school performance. Vouchers that pay for private school tuition
seem to be the last battle that school choice advocates fight in each state. Because
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vouchers cross the church-state divide, states have been slow to pass this legislation.
However, several states have led the way into this final frontier. Florida is one of them.
David Figlio & Cassandra Hart studied the competitive effect of Florida vouchers
in 2010 and found that “…all four measures of competition are positively and
significantly related to student performance (p.23). This study looked at the distance
between the TPS and the closest private school accepting vouchers. The authors find that
every mile closer to the private school increases TPS performance in math and reading by
at least 0.014 of a standard deviation. Likewise, an increase in the number of private
schools available nearby correlates to an increase in test scores. “While these estimated
effects are modest in magnitude, they are very precisely estimated and indicate a positive
relationship between private school competition and student performance in the public
schools” (Figlio et al., 2010, pp. 23-24). At first glance, it seems that TPSs are
responding positively to the threat of vouchers in Florida. More research is needed to
determine the cause of these test score increases.
Matthew Carr’s 2009 dissertation on the Ohio EdChoice program and the effect it
is having on public schools is the study that most closely resembles the research
questions and methodology in this study. It is here that the review of literature is focused
to its narrowest point. Carr’s findings and how he achieved them will be explained, the
flaws will be critiqued, and the new questions, methodology, and findings will be added
to the growing body of knowledge on this topic.
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Carr’s research questions include the following:
(1) Will traditional public school buildings where students are eligible to
use a voucher see significant changes on indicators of overall proficiency
in math and reading than buildings not so threatened?
(2) Will traditional public school buildings where students are eligible to
use a voucher see significant changes on indicators of advanced or limited
proficiency in math and reading than buildings not so threatened?
(3) Will traditional public school buildings where students are eligible to
use a voucher see significant changes on indicators of administrative and
personnel policies (proximal effects) than buildings not so threatened?
(Carr, 2009, p. 139)
Carr addressed his research questions by evaluating data from 2003 to 2008 using
a fixed-effects regression design. The study focused closely on the outcome data from
2006, the year that vouchers were introduced in Ohio. While few effects were observed
on overall proficiency passage rates following the introduction of vouchers, voucherthreatened schools did show significant gains in the percentage of students moving out of
the lowest performance category and in the percentage of students moving into the
highest performance category. (Carr, 2009, p. 139)
Through his proximal effects models (addressing research question 3), Carr also
found that “voucher threatened schools increased resources for staff support, reduced
student truancy, and increased their focus on discipline” (Carr, 2009, p. 139). This third
research question is probably the most important because it gets to the heart of the
improvement question. Did public school administrators make a concerted attempt at
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change or did they just ride out the voucher competition and hope the less successful
students take the voucher option – reverse creaming?
Carr (2009) did his research on the EdChoice program only three years into the
program. He saw that schools faced with the threat of vouchers focused their efforts on
the highest and lowest performers. These students were identified as the ones most likely
to take advantage of the voucher and leave the TPS. He found little overall change in the
passage rates on state testing. The competitive effect of vouchers in Ohio was negligible.
Review of research related to the competitive effects of vouchers on public school
performance suggests that voucher-threatened schools are not harmed by the threat of
voucher schools in the neighborhood. Some TPSs even show slight improvement and the
greater or closer the competition is to the public school, the greater the growth associated
with it. However, we must be careful with these findings. Some research indicates that
the effect is caused by sorting of students, not the positive response to competition that
choice advocates may claim. Many are interested to know if the effect has changed over
time. Now that the Ohio EdChoice program has six years of data, the results of this study
may be entirely different. This leads to the current research.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The methodology for this study was driven by the research questions which are
listed again in the next section. The goal was to isolate the voucher effect on the
performance of the traditional public school as measured by the Performance Index Score
(PIS). Carr used individual student scores from a few specific, grade-level tests to
attempt to isolate the voucher effect on the PIS scores for that school. The methodology
for this study looks at the relationship between voucher-threatened schools and schools
not threatened by vouchers. It also compares the annual growth in PIS before and after
the voucher threat was introduced. A multiple regression is used to compare the effect of
other common predictors of performance with the voucher effect. Finally, a chi-square
test of independence is used to determine if voucher-threatened schools are closing at a
faster rate than their non-threatened neighbors. These four tests should give reliable
answers to the questions below:
Research Questions
1. Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a statistically significant
difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County as measured by the PIS?
2. How well does time explain the variation in mean PIS scores for voucher
eligible and non-voucher schools?
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3. When holding other variables constant, is the threat of vouchers found to be a
statistically significant predictor of PIS variation for voucher eligible schools?
4. Do we see an increased incidence of school closings with voucher eligible
schools in Hamilton County?
Ohio was chosen as the focus of this study for two reasons: (1) Ohio has a
relatively long and established history with educational choice, charter schools, and
vouchers. The Ohio EdChoice program has stood the tests of time, scrutiny, legislation
and litigation. (2) Ohio has an excellent department of education website that has made
the raw data available to the general public: http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp. On
this particular page one can find disaggregated, downloadable, reports going back to the
2000-2001 school year. These reports can then be exported as Excel files for further
sorting and statistical analysis. Another very useful page on the website is the Power
User Reports (http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Power_Users.asp) which can be used to create
custom reports with the specific information needed. A researcher can identify by
county, school district, or individual school building, and then disaggregate the data for
socio-economic status, disability, race, or any other subgroup. Each of the statistical
models will still require cleaning and sorting, but starting with good, solid, readilyavailable, raw data is crucial to further study and peer review.
As was explained near the end of Chapter One, Hamilton County has one of the
best representations of school districts across the state of Ohio. Three other large,
metropolitan school districts in the state were considered for this study, but were
eliminated for separate reasons. Cleveland was eliminated because that particular
voucher program was started in 1995 and data prior to the introduction of vouchers are
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not readily available. This fact alone makes it more difficult to study the competitive
effect of the voucher program in Cleveland over time, which is a focal point of this study.
Columbus was eliminated for the opposite situation. Columbus has several very
affluent neighborhoods with excellent schools. Very few inner-city schools were
threatened by the voucher option, and therefore the EdChoice program would most likely
have had very little competitive effect. Akron was the final option considered, and
although it has a fairly good representation, it is substantially smaller in size and number
of schools compared to Cincinnati.
Instrumentation
The Performance Index Score (PIS) is another unique feature that Ohio
introduced in 2000. This score is derived from a formula that takes into account all of the
Ohio Achievement Assessment (OAA) results of students from third through eighth
grades and the Ohio Graduation Test (OGT) results from grade ten. Higher proficiency
scores receive more weight than lower proficiency scores and then each school is given a
PIS from zero to 120. The PIS is helpful in that it collapses all the test data for each
school into a single score. This score and formula have remained unchanged since it was
introduced in 2000. For research purposes, especially when comparing overall school
improvement over time, this is a very useful data point. Since the researcher is looking
for the competitive effect of vouchers on the overall performance of the TPS, the bulk of
the statistical research will focus on this score.
The reliability and validity of the PIS are directly related to the reliability and
validity of the OAA and OGT. Because the weights are pre-determined, and based on the
level of achievement on these assessments, which are also reliable, each these scores are
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calculated, researchers will achieve the same results. These scores are standardized.
Because the PIS is tied directly to the performance scores on the achievement exams,
which are also standardized, the researcher is testing what he intends to test, making the
PIS valid by definition. Higher scores on the assessments will result in a higher
Performance Index Score for the school.
Variables
The dependent variable in the first few tests of this statistical research is the
percent change in the PIS. The independent variables are (a) Voucher or Non-Voucher
schools based on Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) designation and represented by a
dummy variable, one or zero, and (b) Time. The schools in the voucher threatened
category received a rating of “D” or “F” for three years in a row and are designated by
the dummy variable “one”. The other schools, not immediately threatened by losing
students to vouchers, are represented by a “zero”.
For research question three, a set of control variables are included that are
commonly attributed to the performance indicators of a school: discipline referrals,
minority population, expenditures per pupil, highly qualified teachers, and socioeconomic status. These are independent variables that, when changed over time, often
have an effect on school performance. They are analyzed along with the independent
variable of voucher eligibility or not, again represented by a “one” or a “zero”. The
dependent variable remains the PIS.
The final test uses a discrete variable based on whether or not a school survived
all six years after the introduction of vouchers. For this particular test, the independent
variable remains as “voucher eligibility” and the dependent variable is "school closing".
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However, the nature of these variables is different than that of the continuous variables
utilized in the other tests. That is to say, they are binary, discrete variables (yes or no).
Either the school was voucher eligible, or it was not. Either the school closed, or it did
not. Thus, a special test was used to accommodate these variables—a Chi-Square Test of
Independence.
Procedures
The research began by separating the voucher eligible schools from the nonvoucher eligible schools and running a simple t-test: paired two-sample for means. This
test helped to determine if each group had statistically significant change between 2007
when vouchers were introduced, and 2012, the most recent year for which data are
available. To begin to isolate the voucher effect, the PIS was compared for schools
before and after 2007, when vouchers were introduced. Did performance change at the
same rate before and after vouchers, or did we see a difference in rate of growth? The
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) was calculated to identify if the change in growth
was significant before and after the introduction of vouchers. The graph of those trend
lines demonstrates both similarities and differences. This was followed by a cubic timeseries regression on the voucher group to see if that better represented the trend than a
linear trend line.
A time series, multiple regression was implemented to test the categorical
independent variables. This tested the variance between the mean PIS for each category
of school before and after the introduction of vouchers. Finally, to answer question
number four, the research called for a Chi-Square Test of Independence to see if the
voucher-threatened schools closed at a greater rate than non-voucher schools.
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Threats to Validity
The threat to validity in this research, as identified by Carr (2009) is regression to
the mean. The best control for this threat is to compare the trend before and after the
treatment in both voucher and non-voucher schools. To combat this threat, the research
began with t-tests on the PIS trends before and after vouchers were introduced. This
allowed the researcher to compare the rate of growth and possible trend toward the mean
for both groups, before and after vouchers. The advantage this 2013 study had that Carr
(2009) did not have was four more years of trend data after the introduction of EdChoice.
With the abundance of data available on the ODOE website, this study had as many years
of data before vouchers as after, which helped increase the validity of the trend lines over
time.
The second threat to validity that often comes up in studies on voucher effect is
endogeneity, which can be caused by self-selection bias. This study, like Carr’s (2009)
study, avoided this issue altogether. The focus of this research was only on the threat of
vouchers as determined by a school’s A-F classification. Regardless if any students
actually chose to take the voucher and leave the public school, the researcher wants to
know that school responded to the threat of competition from vouchers? The selfselection bias was eliminated from this study by design.
The third threat to validity had to do with explanation of the results. In this
review of the literature, it was referred to as the “creaming effect” or “reverse creaming”.
What if the PIS trends up or down, not because schools are responding to the
competition, but because students are being sorted into schools that better fit their peer
group, behavior, or socio-economic status? Those variables were included in the study
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and were controlled for by studying the change in each variable after vouchers were
introduced. Those changes were included in the multiple regression and effectively
eliminated as factors in the results of this study, especially when compared with the
voucher effect.
The final threat to validity is the number of school closings between 2007 and
2012. If the voucher-eligible schools closed at a higher rate than the non-voucher eligible
schools, that would affect the validity of this study. It would seem to indicate, not that
voucher threatened schools improved, but that they were forced to close. Eliminating a
higher percentage of lower performing schools from one of the groups being compared
could skew the data upward, giving the impression of improvement, when actually they
are failing at a higher rate. The final test of independence sufficiently dealt with this
threat head on.

31

CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

Research Question One
Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a statistically significant
difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County as measured by the PIS?
The null and alternative hypothesis for this test is stated as follows for voucher eligible
schools:
Ho: µ2007-µ2012≥0
Ha: µ2007-µ2012<0
When we compare PIS scores for voucher eligible and non-voucher eligible
schools 5 years after eligibility began, were those scores higher at a statistically
significant level? Therefore, two paired sample t-tests were run: the first for voucher
eligible schools and the second for non-voucher eligible schools in the year 2007. These
tests compared the mean PIS score for 107 Hamilton County schools with data in 2007
and 2012. The first t-test is 25 schools under the threat of losing students to vouchers.
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Table 1. t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means for Voucher Eligible Schools
Descriptive Data
2007

2012

Mean

69.036

78.944

Variance

57.459

70.828

25

25

Observations
Pearson Correlation
P(T<=t) one-tail

0.346
7.52466E-06

The mean PIS jumped from 69.036 to 78.944 during the experimental period when the
EdChoice voucher program was in full effect. This is significant at p<.01.
For comparison purposes, the next t-test involves the other 82 schools in
Hamilton County that were not in danger in 2007 of losing students to the voucher
program.
Table 2. t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means for Non-Voucher Schools
Descriptive Data
2007

2012

Mean

97.562

98.803

Variance

76.292

92.241

82

82

Observations
Pearson Correlation
P(T<=t) one-tail

0.849
0.0151

The mean PIS for these schools went from 97.56 to 98.80 during the same period,
which is significant at p<.05. To summarize, 2007 Voucher eligible schools saw an
increase in their mean PIS of approximately 10 points. For non-voucher schools, the
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increase was just over 1 point. Both findings were statistically significant, although nonvoucher schools was significant at p<.05 compared to p<.01 for voucher eligible schools.
We reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant change in the PIS after the
introductions of vouchers, and accept the alternative hypothesis which suggests there was
a statistically significant jump in mean PIS for voucher eligible schools. This suggests
that there is a relationship between the introduction of vouchers and the PIS in Hamilton
County, Ohio.
Research Question Two
What if the Hamilton County schools were already growing at a similar rate prior
to the introduction of vouchers? This brings us to research question two. How well does
time explain the variation in mean PIS scores for voucher eligible and non-voucher
schools? Here, the predictor variable is time, and we can compare the results across
voucher eligible and non-voucher eligible schools. Prior to utilizing time as a variable to
predict the variation in PIS scores, it is helpful to explore the rate of growth occurring
across both school categories (before and after vouchers were introduced). Specifically,
the null and alternative hypotheses for this test are stated as follows (both voucher
eligible and non-voucher eligible):
Ho: µCAGR01-06 - µCAGR07-12≤0
Ha: µCAGR01-06 - µCAGR07-12>0
As mentioned, the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) allows us to
compare—not just a change in scores—but the rate of growth across voucher and nonvoucher eligible schools. This is important in order to tease out the velocity of growth
between school categories and make a distinction between them.
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A t-test (assuming unequal variances) will tell if the difference in the growth rate
is significant. Table 3 shows the results of the CAGR for all schools in Hamilton County,
which can be used to compare each subset to the group norm.
Table 3. t-Test: Assuming Unequal Variances for All Hamilton County Schools
Descriptive Data
CAGR 2001-2006
CAGR 2007-2012
Mean
Variance
Observations
P(T<=t) one-tail

6.03

0.827

228.88

3.75

107

107

0.000306221

The mean growth for all Hamilton County schools went from 6.03 PIS points per
year, to .827 PIS points per year. This is a drastic decrease in the rate of growth which
could be attributable to two major variables: the introduction of vouchers or the change
in the state tests, both of which came in the same school year. The state test scores are
the primary determinates of the PIS for each school. Either way, we notice a major
slowing in the rate of growth since 2006.
Here is what we see with schools that are eligible for vouchers in 2007:
Table 4. t-Test: Assuming Unequal Variances for Voucher Eligible Schools
Descriptive Data
CAGR 2001-2006
CAGR 2007-2012
Mean
Variance
Observations
P(T<=t) one-tail

14.48

2.75

890.79

7.21

25

25

0.030965148
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This test shows significance at p<.05. Compound Annual Growth before vouchers was a
little more than twice the rate of the county. After 2006, the CAGR for voucher eligible
schools is more than three times the rate of the rest of Hamilton County. Below are the
results of the non-voucher schools:
Table 5. t-Test: Assuming Unequal Variances for Non-Voucher Schools
Descriptive Data
CAGR 2001-2006
CAGR 2007-2012
Mean
Variance

3.45

0.242

6.814

1.29

82

82

Observations
P(T<=t) one-tail

0.0000

This t-test indicates that growth also slowed for the non-voucher schools. Prior to
vouchers, the compound annual growth was half the rate of Hamilton County. After
vouchers, the growth rate slowed to less than one third that of the rest of the county. All
three tests were significant at p<.05 for a one-tail test.
The Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) comparisons between voucher and
non-voucher eligible schools reveal that voucher eligible schools demonstrate a more
robust rate of growth than the county average or non-voucher eligible schools over a
similar period.
Another way of illustrating this effect is through a time-series regression model.
In a time-series regression, “time” is the independent variable used to explain the
dependent variable, which in this case is mean PIS for the period 2001-2012. The Null
and Alternative Hypothesis are stated as follows:
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Ho: β1+ β2+ β3 = 0
Ha: β1+ β2+ β3 ≠ 0
Note: The beta coefficients are time variables (x, x^2, and x^3). In other words,
by rejecting the null hypothesis, we are concluding that time—whether expressed as
linear (x), quadratic (x^2), or cubic (x^3)—is a good predictor of the dependent variable,
which in this case reflects mean PIS scores.
The results are as follows:
Table 6. Time-Series Regression for Non-Voucher-Schools
Regression Statistics
R Square
0.9665
Standard Error
1.0875
Observations
12
ANOVA
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Period
Period^2
Period^3

df
3
8
11
Coefficients
78.4581
5.1843
-0.4646
0.0142

F
76.85

Standard Error
1.78
1.14
0.20
0.01

Significance F
0.00

P-value
0.0000
0.0019
0.0481
0.1968

Before describing the output, it is important to recognize what is taking place in a
time series regression. As mentioned, time is the explanatory variable with mean PIS
scores by year being the dependent variable. In a regression model, two primary
questions need to be addressed. First, is there a relationship between the predictor
variable(s) and the dependent variable? Second, what line best approximates this
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relationship? In this particular model, there is a strong relationship, but a straight line
(linear) was not the best line to approximate the relationship. Thus, a cubic (polynomial)
line of best fit was used to describe the variation in the dependent variable.
Consequently, this line provided the highest r-squared values for both voucher and nonvoucher schools (meaning that it could explain more of the variation in the dependent
variable: mean PIS).
From a model perspective, we notice two things. First, the r-square is .966. This
means that time explains nearly 97% of the variation in PIS scores for non-voucher
eligible schools. Second, the F-statistic is significant at p<.01. This means that the
model is found to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable.
While r-squared values were high for both time-series models (voucher and nonvoucher eligible schools)—the coefficients tell us something important about the trend
lines for PIS growth. For the non-voucher schools, the coefficient on the cubic variable
(x^3) was positive, implying that we might expect the third “period” of this model to
have a positive increasing trendline. Although the coefficient value was positive, it was
not found to be statistically significant. In other words, where the x and x^2 values fit the
line well, the x^3 value did not. This implies more of a dome shape than the S-shaped
curve typical of a cubic model where coefficient values for x, x^2, and x^3 are positive,
negative, and positive accordingly. This is illustrated in table (7) below.
It is interesting to contrast this model with the voucher eligible time-series
regression. Similar to the non-voucher model, this model (Table 7 below) has a high rsquared value (95.5%) and a statistically significant F-value (implying that the model is
good for prediction purposes). Moreover, we see that the values for x, x^2 and x^3 have
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coefficient values of positive, negative, and positive (similar to the non-voucher time
series model). However, we see that x^3 is statistically significant in this model,
implying that the third period in the line of best fit does, indeed, trend upward. This is
also illustrated below in Table 7.
Table 7. Time-Series Regression for Voucher Eligible Schools
Regression Statistics
R Square
0.9552
Standard Error
2.1471
Observations
12.00

ANOVA
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Period
Period^2
Period^3

df
3
8
11
Coefficients
35.3765
13.8048
-1.9125
0.0892

F
56.81

Standard Error
3.51
2.25
0.39
0.02

Significance F
0.00

P-value
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Based on this information, we reject the null hypothesis for the time series
regression model and accept the alternative (time does explain the variation in mean PIS).
The null for the time series regression is that there is no relationship between time and
PIS scores. There is a relationship between time and PIS scores, and it is a cubic
(polynomial) relationship, which may be easier to visualize with the illustrative graph
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Graph Comparing Change in PIS over Time - Hamilton County
This graph reveals that all schools are showing growth in PIS between 2001 and
2006. Then, something is introduced that causes all schools to show a decline in the
performance index. Most researchers presume that this dip is caused by the new state
assessments that were introduced in 2007 to several million students, not the threat of
several thousand students taking vouchers. This dip will be discussed further in the final
chapter of this study.
The line of best fit for voucher eligible schools is a polynomial line from a cubic
regression. After 2006 is where we see the greatest difference in growth for the voucher
eligible schools. When we evaluate the formulas for the cubic regression we can see a
significant difference in the values that are multiplied by x: In the first sequence 13.805
for the voucher schools, and 5.183 for the non-voucher schools. It is also apparent that
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the polynomial line for non-voucher schools seems to plateau at the end, while the line
for voucher schools is arcing sharply upward. The voucher-threatened schools make up a
lot of ground as they head toward 2012. The achievement gap is closing between the
voucher-threatened schools and the non-threatened schools. It went from a 37 point gap
in 2001 to a 20 point gap in 2012.
Closing the achievement gap between the between failing schools and exemplary
schools cannot be overstated. This is an issue that everyone involved in education is
trying to address. Legislators, superintendents, teachers, reformers, and researchers are
all working to close this gap. It appears that one solution to closing this achievement gap
in Hamilton County involves the competitive effect of EdChoice on the public education
system.
Research Question Three
To validate this claim, however, it is necessary to control for other variables that
might play a role in PIS variation—thus, the third research question: When holding other
variables constant, is the threat of vouchers found to be a statistically significant predictor
of PIS variation for voucher eligible schools?
H0: Vouchers do not have an influence on the variation of the PIS (when adding control
variables to the regression model).
Ho: β1+ β2+…+ βn = 0
Ha: β1+ β2+…+ βn ≠ 0
This is where it can get tricky. Is it possible to isolate the voucher effect when
there are so many variables that impact the performance of a school? To do this one must
isolate the 135 schools in Hamilton County that had data in both 2007 and 2012. This is
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a different set than was studied in the first part of this research because that previous
analysis could only include schools that had performance scores every year from 2001 to
2012. Now that we are looking at demographic data and a shorter span of years, more
schools can be included in the study.
A snapshot of school data in 2007 and in 2012 included each control variable, and
using a multiple regression, identified significant factors in the determination of the PIS.
The dependent variable is the percent change in the PIS between 2007 and 2012. The
independent variables are as follows: 1. Voucher eligible in 2007; 2. Percent change in
discipline infractions; 3. Average percent minority students; 4. Percent change in
expenditure per pupil; 5. Average percent highly qualified teachers; 6. Average percent of
economically disadvantaged students. The multiple regression will indicate which of
these independent variables has the greatest effect on the PIS scores between these two
years.
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Table 8. Multiple Regression for all Hamilton County Schools 2007-2012
Regression Statistics
R Square
0.323413483
Standard Error
0.114421497
Observations
135
ANOVA
Regression
Residual
Total

df
6
128
134

Intercept
2007 Voucher Eligible?
% Change Disc.
Ave. % Minority
% change in $
Ave. % HQ Teachers
Average Econ Dis

F
10.19749501

Coefficients
-0.142330249
0.197615695
-0.000380748
-0.021702055
-0.00381025
0.178056366
-0.021167698

Significance F
3.30797E-09

Standard Error
0.169679898
0.028962187
0.001218046
0.055669989
0.028864682
0.164470301
0.061564615

P-value
0.403136236
3.18603E-10
0.755101377
0.697307189
0.895188487
0.281019026
0.731539065

None of the p-values are significant EXCEPT the p-value for whether or not the
school was eligible for vouchers in 2007. This is a “Dummy Variable” where if the
school was eligible they get a 1 and if they weren’t eligible they get a 0. Thus, we say
that going from a 0 to a 1 (non-voucher eligible to voucher eligible) is like adding an
additional 19.76% to a school’s % change in PIS Scores (the coefficient associated with
this variable).
With an F-value for significance well below .01 we see that this model has
predictive power at a statistically significant level. However, when we look at the pvalues for each individual predictor variable, the only variable for the 135 included
schools that has significance is the voucher eligible variable at p<.01. And with a
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coefficient value near 20%, we see that vouchers have a significant positive relationship
with the percent change in PIS. Going from a non-voucher eligible school to a voucher
eligible school is associated with a .19 or a 19% increase in PIS from 2007 to 2012. This
provides evidence that voucher eligibility is a good predictor of the variation in PIS. We
can safely reject the null hypothesis that vouchers do not have an effect on the PIS when
other variables are held constant. No other variable in this model accounts for as much of
the Performance Index Score variation as does the voucher variable.
Some may point out that the R-squared (or the coefficient of determination) only
accounts for about one-third of the variation in PIS (.323 or 32.3%). However, this value
is acceptable when studying human behavior. The variables included in this study are the
same variables that educators often use to explain why a school improvement initiative
will or will not work. These demographic indicators are some of the best available to
predict individual student performance. However, when applied to a whole school
growth model or predictor of school performance, they just do not hold up. Other
variables that may have an influence on test scores like curriculum implementation,
instructional strategies, or teacher motivation have not been included in this study, even
though these variables would most likely play a role in explaining the variation in the
dependent variable (% change PIS). However, most of them cannot be “modeled” or
captured in a regression model. For example, motivated teachers would likely influence
student performance, but one cannot simply put “motivation” into a regression model.
The first three research questions have helped to substantiate the use of vouchers
as a means to improve public school performance. In other words, voucher eligible
schools that were still around from 2007 to 2012 do better. That is the good news. Is
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there another side to that coin? A common charge against vouchers is that they
accelerate school closings. So, criticism might be that voucher eligible schools do better,
if they survive, but if vouchers cause a lot of public schools to close they are not really a
catalyst for improvement. As the data were being collected for these tests it was difficult
to find enough schools in Hamilton County that had data for the entire twelve year
period. Some schools began well and then the data ends at 2009, so that school was
eliminated from the study. It can be assumed, based on the state and federal sanctions for
school improvement that these schools had failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress
(AYP) and were summarily closed or reorganized. Other schools only have data from
2007 on and it seems that these were the reorganized schools that were born out of the
death of a failing school. The data seemed to indicate that schools either made significant
improvement and stayed open, or did not make improvement and were forced to close or
reorganize. It is only fair to investigate this claim, even if it derails the entire study.
Research Question Four
The final research question is this: Do we see an increased incidence of school
closings with voucher eligible schools in Hamilton County?
To answer this question, a Chi-Square “test of independence” was run to help
determine whether a relationship existed between voucher eligibility and school closings.
A Chi-Square test explores relationships between discrete, or categorical, variables—
making it a natural fit for the two variables of interest (voucher eligible=yes/no; school
closed between 2007 and 2012=yes/no). The null and alternative hypotheses are stated as
follows:
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Ho: Voucher eligibility and School Closings are independent; no relationship
Ha: Voucher eligibility and School Closings are not independent; related
In 2012, 280 Hamilton County Schools were in existence, but 63 of those schools
did not exist in 2007 and were removed from this test. We are only interested in schools
that were open in 2007 and whether or not they were still open in 2012. That leaves 217
schools with data and this group of schools comprises the final data set. Of these 217
schools, 43 closed between 2007 and 2012. This left 174 schools that survived this 6
year period. Figure 2 illustrates the data.

Figure 2. Chart Comparing School Closings from 2007-2012
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Most educators understand that if a school does not show Adequate Yearly
Progress, it will eventually be taken over by the state, reorganized, or shut down. It
seems to reason that if a school is eligible for vouchers, it is not only in danger of losing
students and money, but it is also in danger of being closed. It appears that the
proportions are in line with what we would expect.
As we can see from the graph, Hamilton County had 43 schools close between
2007 and 2012 and 174 schools that did not close during this period. This means that
nearly 20% or one out of five schools, voucher or not, closed or reorganized. On the left
set of columns there is a higher than average ratio of voucher-eligible schools that closed
(12/43=27%). On the right side we see only 23% (50/217 = 23%) of all Hamilton County
schools are eligible for vouchers. Another way to look at it is that 24% (12/50=24%) of
all voucher-eligible schools closed their doors between 2007 and 2012. This is higher
than the average of 20%.
The fact remains that a greater percentage of voucher eligible schools did close in
Hamilton County. The question remains, is it different enough to be statistically
significant? To find out, it was put to a statistical test: a Chi-Square test of independence.
Table 9 has the results.
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Table 9. Chi-Square Test of Independence for School Closings in Hamilton County
Was the School Voucher Eligible in 2007? * Did the School Close Between 2007 and
2012? Crosstabulation
Did the School Close
Between 2007 and 2012?
N=217 Schools in Hamilton County
Yes
No
Total
Was the School
No Count
31
136
167
Voucher Eligible in
Expected Count
33.1
133.9
167.0
2007?
% within Was the 18.6%
81.4%
100.0%
School Voucher
Eligible in 2007?
Yes Count
12
38
50
Expected Count
9.9
40.1
50.0
% within Was the 24.0%
76.0%
100.0%
School Voucher
Eligible in 2007?
Total
Count
43
174
217
Expected Count
43.0
174.0
217.0
% within Was the 19.8%
80.2%
100.0%
School Voucher
Eligible in 2007?
Chi-Square Test
Pearson Chi-Square
N of Valid Cases

Value
.716
217

df
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.397

This table restates that nearly 20% (19.8) of all schools in Hamilton County
closed their doors or reorganized between 2007 and 2012. Twenty-four (24%) of the
voucher-eligible schools closed their doors during the same period compared with 18.6%
of non-voucher schools. If these percentages are different enough, the Pearson ChiSquare value will be less than .05. In this analysis, the Pearson Chi-Square is .397, which
is not statistically significant because the P-value is > .05. Is there a relationship between
voucher eligibility and school-closings? According to the chi-square output, there is not.
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Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis which states that there is no
relationship between school closings and vouchers in Hamilton County. According to
this test, we have enough evidence to say that the two are independent of each other.
Therefore, this would not fit with a narrative claiming that voucher eligibility exacerbates
school closings—at least in Hamilton County.
Summary of Results
The four research questions that drove this study were answered by the data
returned. The first question asked if there was a significant difference in the PIS for
voucher and non-voucher schools, before and after vouchers were introduced. The model
found that there is significance at p<.05 for non-voucher; p<.01 for voucher. In Hamilton
County Ohio there is a significant change in the PIS after the introduction of vouchers for
both types of school. The second question attempted to isolate time as a variable and
identify the shape of the trend line before and after vouchers were introduced. Using the
Compound Annual Growth Rate and a time-series regression, time was found to be a
significant variable in the change in PIS for all schools. Once again, however, voucher
eligible schools grew at a faster rate than the non-voucher schools, and closed the
achievement gap by 17 PIS points.
The next step was to use a multiple regression to isolate the voucher effect from
five other variables that could have played a role in changes in the PIS for each school
after the introduction of vouchers. The voucher variable was the only one that had a
statistically significant effect on the PIS. And the final step was to determine if voucher
eligible schools were closing or reorganizing at a higher rate than non-voucher schools.
The finding of the chi-square test of independence was that schools threatened by
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vouchers are not closing at a higher rate, statistically, than schools not threatened by
vouchers. Chapter five will discuss what this means for the traditional public schools in
Hamilton County, Ohio.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The question of competition in education has been debated and tested for
generations, and it will continue to be debated for generations to come, especially when it
includes vouchers. This study adds only a trifle to that conversation, and is by no means
conclusive. However, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the data coming
out of Hamilton County, Ohio in the wake of the EdChoice program introduced in 2006.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents the purpose
and methodology of this study. In the second section, the conclusions reached for each of
the four research questions and the null hypotheses are discussed. The final section
presents recommendations for further research on the competitive effect of vouchers. In
addition, the final section offers implications from the research for state legislators who
are currently debating this issue.
Purpose and Methodology
The purpose of this study was to investigate the competitive effect of vouchers on
the traditional public school as measured by changes in the quality of education measured
by a Performance Index Score for each school. Initially, the concept of a voucher was
primarily promoted as a tool to equalize educational opportunities for parents. Now that
vouchers are being touted by legislators as a catalyst for public school improvement,
educators want to know if it is working as claimed.
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This study focused on the EdChoice “voucher” program in Hamilton County,
Ohio, which is home to Cincinnati Public Schools as well as several suburban districts
surrounding the inner-city. School performance was measured by the Performance Index
Score (PIS) which is a comprehensive rating for each school building based on test scores
and other education data benchmarks. The purpose of this study was to attempt to isolate
the voucher effect from the other major effects on the PIS, and determine the significance
of that effect.
The methodology for isolating the voucher effect began with a comparison of the
mean trendline for voucher-threatened schools prior to the introductions of vouchers, and
the mean trendline for schools not threatened by vouchers. Is there a relationship
between the mean Performance Index Scores and the introduction of vouchers? It also
compared the compound annual growth rates in performance scores before and after the
voucher threat was introduced. A time-series regression was employed to determine the
relationship that time had as an explanatory variable and the line of best fit. A multiple
regression was used to compare the effect of other common predictors of performance
with the voucher effect. Finally, a chi-square was used to determine if voucherthreatened schools closed at a faster rate than their non-threatened neighbors. These tests
gave reliable answers to the research questions posed, answered, and analyzed in the next
section.
Conclusions
Research Question number 1: Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a
statistically significant difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County
as measured by the PIS? We rejected the null hypothesis that there is no significant

52
change in the PIS after the introductions of vouchers. There is a positive relationship
between the introduction of vouchers and the PIS in Hamilton County, Ohio at p<.05 for
all public schools. In fact, if a school is threatened by a voucher, the mean increase in the
PIS is almost 10 points, and the significance increases to p<.01. Whereas the mean
increase for public schools not threatened by vouchers is just over 1 point and is
significant a p<.05. Although the research might have stopped here, this statistic does not
convince the reader or the researcher. How do we know that vouchers were responsible
for the increase in the mean PIS? What if the mean PIS for both groups was already
growing at a similar rate before the introduction of vouchers? There are still too many
unanswered questions. So we press on to the second question.
Research question 2: How well does time explain the variation in mean PIS
scores for voucher eligible and non-voucher schools? This question was answered in two
parts. The null and alternative hypotheses for the first test are stated as follows (both
voucher eligible and non-voucher eligible): There is no change in the Compound Annual
Growth Rate (CAGR) for the six years prior to the introduction of vouchers, compared to
the six years after the introduction of vouchers. We rejected the null hypothesis and
found that there is a significant change in both voucher and non-voucher threatened
schools at p<.05. For voucher eligible schools, the Compound Annual Growth before
2006 was a little more than twice the rate of the county. After 2006, the CAGR for
voucher eligible schools was more than three times the rate of the rest of Hamilton
County. And non-voucher threatened schools dropped to one third the growth rate of the
rest of the county.
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The null hypothesis for the second test involving time was stated as follows:
There is no change in the PIS over time for Hamilton county schools. We rejected the
null after running the time-series regression because in fact there is a relationship
between time and PIS scores, and it is a cubic (polynomial) relationship. For nonvoucher threatened schools, the third iteration of time is not significant, p>.05, but for
voucher-threatened schools, the third iteration of time is significant at p<.01. What this
shows is that in 2008, two years after vouchers were introduced, the PIS for non-voucher
schools leveled off. However, the PIS for voucher-threatened schools began to arc
sharply upward again and continue to rise. This was the information that Carr (2009) did
not have when he completed his research in 2009. This shows the influence that time has
had on the PIS for voucher-threatened schools.
In chapter 4 it was noted that there is a significant dip in test scores that ultimately
affect the PIS for each school. In 2006 the Ohio State Achievement Tests hit their peak,
and then in 2007 we see a drop in scores across the state. The state tests were changed to
include more stringent standards and subsequently scores went down. This follows the
pattern of any new education initiative where schools see an implementation dip.
Interestingly, the public schools not threatened by vouchers have essentially plateaued
since 2008. They did not rebound like the voucher-threatened schools did. It could be
concluded that the competitive effect of vouchers continues to help drive scores upward.
But before we draw that conclusion, we must investigate the potential that other variables
could have on the PIS, which leads to the next research question.
Research question three: When holding other variables constant, is the threat of
vouchers found to be a statistically significant predictor of PIS variation for voucher
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eligible schools? The null hypothesis states that vouchers do not have an influence on the
variation of the PIS. A snapshot of school data in 2007 and in 2012 included each control
variable, and then, with a multiple regression, identified significant factors in the
determination of the PIS. The dependent variable was the percent change in the PIS
between 2007 and 2012. The independent variables were voucher eligible in 2007,
percent change in discipline infractions, average percent minority students, percent
change in expenditure per pupil, average percent highly qualified teachers, and average
percent of economically disadvantaged students.
The multiple regression indicated which of these independent variables had the
greatest effect on the PIS scores between these two years. The only variable that had any
significant effect on the PIS was the voucher variable at p<.01, and this effect accounted
for 19% of the percent change in the PIS between 2007 and 2012. Voucher eligibility is a
good predictor of PIS. We can safely reject the null hypothesis that vouchers do not have
an effect on the PIS when other variables are held constant. No other variable in this
model accounts for as much of the performance indicator score as does the voucher
variable.
This test also indirectly addresses the “creaming” or “reverse creaming” debate
that presented itself in the Review of Related Literature (Chapter 2). If creaming was
actually taking place, then these other demographic variables would have a greater effect
on the PIS than the data indicate. It seems that if some sort of creaming is taking place,
and students are being sorted based on race or socio-economic status, it is having no
measurable effect on the change in PIS of these schools.

55
The results of the first three research questions established the voucher-effect as a
catalyst for traditional public school improvement. It seems that voucher-eligible schools
are closing the achievement gap with non-voucher threatened schools and the PISs for
these schools are headed in the right direction. The final research question was included
to investigate the claim of voucher critics that while some schools improve to avoid
losing students to vouchers, the rest are just being shut down. Perhaps that would
account for some of the improvement. Because those underperforming schools are not
included in the study, we really do not see the full picture.
Research question four: Do we see an increased incidence of school closings with
voucher eligible schools in Hamilton County? The null hypothesis was “voucher
eligibility” and “school closings are independent”; there is no relationship. What we
found is that roughly one fifth of all schools, voucher or not, closed in Hamilton County
between 2007 and 2012. Voucher-eligible schools did close at a slightly greater rate in
Hamilton County. To find if this difference is statistically significant it was put into a
statistical test: a Chi-Square test of independence. The results of the Chi-Square test
found that there was no statistically significant difference in the rate of school closings
between voucher and non-voucher threatened schools. Therefore, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis. There is no relationship between voucher eligibility and school closings
in Hamilton County, Ohio.
In conclusion, traditional public schools in Hamilton County, Ohio have little to
fear when it comes to competition posed by voucher eligibility. It seems that schools are
responding positively to that threat, performance is improving, and voucher-threatened
schools are in no more danger of closing than those not threatened by vouchers. When it
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comes to change in the PIS, minority populations, families in poverty, discipline
infractions, per-pupil spending, and teacher certification have less to do with school
performance than the competitive effect of EdChoice (voucher) legislation.
Recommendations and Implications
It is interesting to watch each state debate the pros and cons of educational choice.
Charters, vouchers, and educational choice are moving across this country at varying
rates, and these changes should be made cautiously and circumspectly. Ohio is one state
that seems to be leading the way when it comes to educational choice, and the voucher
program they have established applies specifically to schools that have been failing for
three years out of five. This seems to intensify the competitive effect of the voucher
program, because these schools would feel the financial loss of these students
immediately and profoundly.
Some states, like Indiana, have implemented voucher programs that are much
more comprehensive, but actually mitigate the competitive effect of the voucher. In
Indiana, all students from any school district are eligible to apply for a voucher. And
when those monies are applied to a private school, a little bit is taken out of the pot for all
public schools. For education choice proponents, Indiana is preferred over Ohio.
However, for those promoting vouchers as catalyst for school improvement, some of the
competitive effect is lost in Indiana. Even if zero students from a given school take a
voucher, that school will still lose revenue because the total pot of money for public
education is reduced. Alternatively, if a significant number of students leave a particular
school to take a voucher, the financial impact is spread over all the schools in the entire
state. Of course the school that lost students to vouchers will also lose the funding it
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would have received from those students. For the competitive effect of vouchers to
produce results similar to what we found in Hamilton County, Ohio, the program must be
similar.
Now, since this research was completed, legislators in Ohio voted in 2013 to
expand the EdChoice Scholarship Program to include all low-income students from any
school. Apparently the effect of vouchers on failing schools was significant enough to
justify applying the rules to any school in the state. The changes will begin with the
kindergarten class in the fall of 2014 when low-income students from A, B, and C rated
schools can also apply for vouchers in Ohio. And the cap on EdChoice scholarships
which was set at 14,000 for the past 6 years has been increased to 60,000 scholarships. It
will be interesting to see if the exemplary schools who are now threatened by vouchers
will see an increase in performance scores. If an exemplary school has plateaued
performance, the competitive effect of vouchers may be able to prompt an increase.
Recommendations from this study are as follows:
1. Legislators who want to use vouchers as a catalyst for TPS improvement
should follow an implementation model similar to the EdChoice program in
Ohio. Do not assume that all voucher programs are the same. This one is
unique and should be researched thoroughly, especially considering the recent
changes.
2. Be sure the voucher program is comprehensive enough to provide real
educational choice for parents in the lowest performing schools. This should
always remain the primary purpose for vouchers.
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3. The voucher program should not penalize schools that are showing continuous
improvement and/or exemplary status. Although if an exemplary school has
plateaued, vouchers may be a viable option to promote performance growth.
4. Be sure that the vouchers are taken directly from the funding from the school
that is consistently failing, so that they feel the direct effect of the competition
for those dollars.
If these recommendations are followed, a voucher program may have a similar,
positive, competitive effect on the performance of the traditional public school. This is
the beginning of the research on competitive effects of vouchers, and much more must be
done.
Also, there were several questions raised during the research that are outside the
scope of this study. These would be great questions for further research:
1. Why did the voucher-eligible schools show improvement in the PIS?
2. What professional development, staff training, curriculum, or program
changes were made in response to the vouchers that may have affected the
PIS?
3. When a voucher eligible school was forced to close, what happened to the
students? Where did they go? Did they perform at a higher level after
attending another school?
4. When a voucher eligible school reorganized, did the students show
improvement in the new model? Currently, there is no easy way to follow the
schools that reorganize to see the result. The Ohio State Department of
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Education does not publish this information, but this would be a very
interesting study.
5. What percentage of students in these schools actually takes a voucher, and do
school administrators and staff really perceive this as a threat to the funding or
viability of their school? Is this threat enough to prompt systemic changes?
6. As Ohio expands the EdChoice Scholarship Program to include all schools,
will the exemplary schools with plateaued performance show increases in the
PIS? Will the competitive effect of vouchers be able to push through the
performance ceiling at the top of the scale?
Summary
The new face of education in the United States of America includes a measure of
competition. And vouchers, which will probably claim a relatively small market share of
that system, are here to stay. Educators can either fight these programs or embrace them,
but they can no longer be ignored. The results of this study indicate that vouchers should
not be feared. In Hamilton County, Ohio, vouchers are not causing the traditional public
schools to close their doors disproportionately. In fact, the EdChoice (voucher) program
seems to be having a positive effect on the performance scores of their previously failing
schools. The achievement gap is closing as scores from these voucher-eligible schools
continue to rise. The students in the traditional public schools in Hamilton County, Ohio
are not being left behind.
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